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Pronouns have an indexical or deictic function. Their reference is variable,
in the case of personal pronouns depending on pragmatic factors such
as who is speaking to whom and who is being talked about, and it can
be adjusted quite flexibly to textual and contextual, or conversational
needs. So, while their anaphoric qualities make them an important instru-
ment for creating textual cohesion, which under normal circumstances
(i.e., on unmarked levels of interpretation) is a prerequisite for contextual
coherence, their referential variability can result in vagueness and fluctu-
ating uncertainty. What is locally cohesive can thus still be contextually
incoherent. Proper names, on the other hand, are normally used as rigid
designators. Quoted forms can be viewed as a specific class of (proper)
names individualizing particular forms as relocations of their category (I
cannot go into more detail here about the different kinds of nominaliz-
ations and their effects); quotation can thus be regarded as a means of
transforming variable designators into rigid ones. In the enigmatic poem
to be discussed, Lewis Carroll makes ample use of this instrument; as
the English past tense doesn't have person or number agreement
(cf. I/You/He/She/It went), he can easily avoid explicitly noting the differ-
ence between quoted and unquoted (anaphoric) forms, and can rather
draw specifically on the resulting ambiguity. His virtuosity in handling
the different levels of designation illustrates how human symbolic abilities
allow him (and us) to introduce new levels of meaning and to stimulate
our search for possible interpretations by obscuring the seemingly
obvious.
Making sense of nonsense can be a hard job — sometimes, it seems,
harder than encoding sense as nonsense. Evidence whose message is
anything but evident allows of all kinds of interpretations; especially if
it appears under the heading of 'Alice's evidence' and is known to have
been composed by the notorious 'glutton of words' Lewis Carroll. In
fact, if the creator of your witness hides his real name, you shouldn't
trust the witness too much; if, as in this particular case, you only have
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the 'evidence' without the authorizing witness, everything must be fake,
fabricated.
Alice's adventures in Wonderland culminate in one of the best-known
trials of (literary) history. After the White Rabbit has stated the case
with the well-known four lines
The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts,
all on a summer day:
The Knave of Hearts, he stole the tarts,
and took them quite away!' (p. 115)
we experience a (not unexpectedly) rather inconclusive and chaotic cross-
examination of the Mad Hatter (assisted by his friend, the March Hare)
and an even shorter questioning of the Duchess's cook. Quite to her own
surprise, Alice is finally called as a witness. This takes us to the final
chapter of the book ('Alice's evidence', pp. 122-132). The title of the
chapter is misleading, since Alice tells the King right away that she
doesn't know anything at all about the Hearts's tarts. So in the end,
whether the Knave of Hearts's head will be chopped off seems to
depend on the only evidence left: a piece of paper with a poem on it of
which Alice says (p. 127) '/don't believe there's an atom of meaning in
it', whereas the King (and judge) tries to understand it. After exchanging
a few harsh words with the Queen (who wants her head to be chopped
off— what else?), Alice (who had already started growing back to normal
size before the poem was read to the jury) is suddenly woken up by her
sister, and Wonderland dissolves.
Since beheading has always been the special executional treatment for
the privileged, namely, kings or queens and their nobility, but has obvi-
ously deteriorated, or — even worse — been downgraded by this what's
his name rogue L. C. to knavery, we are not interested in the legal side
of the case, nor in its repercussions for the foundations of the Victorian
Empire; from a twentieth-century gourmet perspective, the tarts may
have been punishment enough. No, our efforts are directed towards an
understanding of what the White Rabbit reads before the court, which
is a royal court (of cardboard — mind you: L. C. was a visionary) as
well as a court of justice (a 'card board'). The more sophisticated reader
may (or may not) wonder if comprehensive schools are open to white
rabbits these days, but we prefer not to go into such meticulous details.
We would merely like to suggest a reading of the 'evidence poem' and
speculate, without excursions that venture too far into the unknown,
about its 'sense' near the end of Alice in Wonderland.
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As others have rightly observed, pronouns are the main protagonists
of the poem; and, frankly, if you were envisaging a death sentence,
wouldn't you rather send a pronoun to its execution, however knavish
other people would consider that to be? The hang(wo)man (just to
balance the obvious sexual bias in the choice of a [fe]male suspect) would
certainly do justice to his/her name and hang around waiting for a
suitable referent of the pronoun. Doubtless, the suspense in the audience
would be enormous, before everything gradually faded away into a joke
because the whole execution would have to be suspended. This is precisely
the role of the seemingly enigmatic poem: It is the pivot on which the
door between reality and fantasy hinges.
Lewis Carroll, the mathematician, is well known and often quoted for
his view of language as an arbitrary symbolic system the user of which,
especially in the case of a poet, can choose what he wants his words to
signify, and he himself makes extensive use of this possibility. His readers,
however, must not be humpty-dumptified and carried away by this sort
of extreme option or the expectation of it. We should try to understand
the sense before 'sensifying' the nonsense, just as the jocular or the absurd
have to be taken seriously to a certain degree before a sensation of
funniness can fully unfold.
When Chomsky started formalizing the algebraic properties of syntax,
Humpty Dumpty appeared to many to act as a kind of anti-idealist
godfather. Identifying human language with the set of acceptable senten-
ces created by a rule system with such profane elements as inputs, outputs,
and variables appeared blasphemous in a Humboldtian tradition (forget-
ting about the positivists) still prevalent in the tower of Babel (although
once the linen was stripped off the ghost, the spirit wasn't all that bad).
That this equation of language faculty and algebraically enumerated set
of sentences was empirically inadequate with regard to textual structure
was obvious right from the beginning. The notion of text requires more
than any old set of sentences; coherence became one of the magic terms,
and pronouns are usually quoted as its most perspicuous illustrations. If
you don't know whether the tart thief was male or female, a greedy
caterpillar (or maybe several of them), you can't even make the right
choice of pronoun in the assertion he/she/they/it stole the tarts. And if a
knavish male was mentioned as a possible suspect and you pick she in
the subsequent sentence, your speech is either doomed to incoherence or
it implies an anonymous accusation (hinting at a male chauvinist spirit).
The latter is the more probable interpretation, since we all start from the
friendly cooperative assumption that one doesn't produce incoherent
speech. So, pronouns are among the prime indicators of text coherence
(cohesion), and ambiguities in pronominal reference can easily disrupt it.
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 13.11.18 10:36
124 K. Maroldt
Following the rules of the language game is just one, admittedly the
most common, way of exploiting them. But speakers can also deliberately
disobey these rules, thereby exploring the communicative services of
deviance, the non-regular which presupposes the regularities. This sort
of strategy is not uncommon in everyday (mainly jocular) communication,
which is quite rich in nonce-words, blends ('portmanteau' creations —
to stick to the genre), ad hoc word formation, deliberate over-extensions
of rules, unconventional metaphor, etc. The most original applications,
however, can best be traced in creative writing, and 'readjusting' the rules
is a recurrent theme in Alice in Wonderland, too.
In the 'evidence poem' Lewis Carroll makes masterful use of the Janus-
like textual properties of pronominal reference. What can be used to
unify can also be used to separate, and Carroll exploits both sides of the
coin, extracting full value for his reader. My detailed analysis below
uncovers a very intricate system of pronominal reference within the poem,
while cutting off any identifiable bonds with the outside world: 'It isn't
directed at all' ... 'in fact, there's nothing written on the outside' ... 'It
isn't a letter, after all: it's a set of verses'. The plural pronouns are text-
internally tied to singular pronoun denotata by a closely knit web of
cataphoric or anaphoric reference. By using the pronoun forms as names
(the pronouns in italics in the poem below) Carroll even cancels their
most conspicuous property of variablehood, using them as constants, but
making simultaneous use of them as quasi-self-referential pronouns desig-
nating their person in the paradigm. The enigmatic character of the poem
arises because the reader is inclined to search for external referents among
the dramatis personae or in the 'real' world. The literal meaning of the
verses, however, amounts to a repetitive arrangement of the three singular
persons of the pronominal paradigm in a much more direct and concrete
way than Reichert (1974: 99 ff.) seems to imply. And it makes sense
beyond this literal interpretation as a playful return to the 'cruel Three'
(p. 10) of the introductory poem, triggered by a psychologically quite
convincing association of the three 'persons' in the poem (which are, in
fact, variables) and the three 'real' persons of the fictive audience (which
may well relate to the three well-known real young ladies of his environ-
ment). After all, it is a 'three-legged table, all made of solid glass' (p. 15),
and therefore transparent as the pronouns are, which holds the golden
'key reference' to Wonderland. As 'glassy' variables, the pronouns are
inherently deictic and could be bound poem-internally as well as poem-
externally or in a text-transcending way. With regard to the plot (the
second option), they remain absolutely unbound, as becomes particularly
clear in the course of the king's vain efforts (p. 128) to tie them to the
dramatis personae. So the only escape route out of the poem's labyrinth,
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which starts with a cataphoric they and ends with an equally cataphoric
them, is via its insistent orbiting around 'the three' persons, not via its
connection to the reported wonderland fantasies. The few possibly poem-
external references we find are induced by syntactic necessity and are
ambiguous, since person deixis depends on the distribution of communi-
cative roles (speaker/hearer etc.), which can shift and to which the reader
can adjust his point of view with almost unbounded virtuosity. Generally,
the exclusively poem-internal reading, i.e., the reading that is totally
disconnected from the plot, is more convincing. The confusion arising
from constantly shifting assignments of referents to the pronouns is
psychologically also realistic as far as linguistic development is concerned:
pronominal reference is not fully acquired until relatively late, precisely
because of the complicated shifts of perspective it requires. So combining
partial pronominal order with chaos complies very well with the kind of
children's dream world narrated here.
The poem
They told me you had been to her,
And mentioned me to him:
She gave me a good character,
But said I could not swim.
He sent them word I had not gone,
(We know it to be true):
If she should push the matter on,
What would become of you?
I gave her one, they gave him two,
You gave us three or more;
They all returned from him to you
Though they were mine before.
If I or she should chance to be
involved in this affair,
He trusts to you to set them free,
Exactly as we were.
My notion was that you had been
(Before she had this fit)
An obstacle that came between
him, and ourselves, and it.
Don't let him know she liked them best,
For this must ever be
A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself and me.3
The interpretation
They told me you had been to her,
(In the internal reading suggested above: they=cataphoric for you and
her, which are used as proper names for the pronouns of the object case;
an external reference is not explicitly excluded, the readers and listeners
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are even misled by their expectations onto this garden path leading
nowhere. Like you and her, me is quoted and treated as an individual.)
And mentioned me to him:
She gave me a good character,
(Note the shift in case, which gives further support and coherence to the
internal interpretation: the nominative of me is / with the unique capital-
letter 'character'. Note further the dual function of she as anaphoric for
her [thus creating textual coherence (= cohesion)], but simultaneously
establishing a new situation as a proper name.)
But said / could not swim.
(Swim = stand alone in the pronominal paradigm without the support of
a second person pronoun.)
He sent them word 7 had not gone,
(Them = anaphoric for you and her [adapting the initial they to case
requirements], meaning / was not the first person of the object case.)
(We know it to be true):
(we = resumptive for / and she [as you has so far only appeared in the
object paradigm and is still to complete the subject case], shifting to a
first-person point of view, but it could well include the reader/writer and
their audiences [the parenthesis even encourages this kind of non-internal
reading by suggesting shared knowledge beyond the poem; obviously this
move is to lead the reader astray in order to keep the ambiguity of the
poem in effect]; so it is ambiguous and could refer anaphorically to the
preceding statement or the pronoun it as part of the paradigm missing
so far in any case.)
If she should push the matter on,
(The matter of completing the nominative paradigm by 'usurping' you
[cf. line 4]; she is quoted here, so it is a proper name.)
What would become of you?
(As all the protagonists of the poem [especially the set of first- and third-
person-singular subject- and object-case pronouns] have been introduced,
you is brought up, which has the specific property of being symmetrical
and unspecified with regard to case.)
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The third stanza seems to me to be the most ambiguous one. The most
probable interpretation appears to be that it relates to the symmetry and
case-neutrality of you in mutual address.
/ gave her one, they gave him two,
(They = anaphoric for 7 and her, the numbers refer to the numbers of
jow-relations between 7 and her [one], they and him [two]; so gave refers
to addressing someone.)
You gave us three or more;
(Us = first person plurality, but again ambiguous as to inclusion of
readers/listeners; depending on what you count you get at least three
jyow-addresses.)
They all returned from him to you
(They = anaphoric for all j>ow-addresses that were given by him [= anapho-
ric for you] are returned to you by the addressees.)
Though they were mine before.
(Mine is the syntactically induced equivalent of me [note the first two
lines, where me, you, her, him are grouped together], who started all the
you-ing. Note further that the poem-internal pseudo-events mix the cases
before they are sorted out in the next two stanzas.)
(subject case)
If 7 or she should chance to be
involved in this affair,
(Namely, the affair of building up the paradigm, in this special stanza
the subject case paradigm.)
He trusts to you to set them free,
(Them=anaphoric for 7 and she', setting them free means completing
their paradigm.)
Exactly as we were.
(we = anaphoric for 7 and she, this time switching over to a first-person
point of view; again the inclusion of readers/listeners is a possibility
re-enforced by the literal meaning of being free in contrast to the suspect.)
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(object case)
My notion was that you had been
(my standing for the first person here; note that this stanza is dedicated
to the object case)
(Before she had this fit)
(The fit of giving me the subject character 7 mentioned in line 3 of
the poem.)
An obstacle that came between
him, and ourselves, and it.
(Ourselves resumes me and her, in the paradigm you is obviously the
Obstacle' between me and him/her/it.)
The final stanza is resumptive with regard to the poem and leads the
reader back to the external events.
Don't let him know she liked them best,
(Them = anaphoric for / and you, and simultaneously, by a syntactically-
conditioned shift in case [canceling the separation of the two cases in the
preceding stanzas and unifying the whole pronoun lot again], cataphoric
for j>0w(rself) and me)
For this must ever be
A secret, kept from all the rest,
Between yourself ana me.
(The 'secret' underlines the enigmatic element, the final first- and second-
person pronouns, which are normally interactive, again invoke the
impression of a mutual understanding [including the reader] beyond the
text, but conveyed by it; once more the 'garden path' is offered. Note
also that in the paradigm there is no slot between the first and the second
person, so the last line, taken literally could be interpreted as referring
to the empty set, a sort of corollary with regard to the contextual
relevance of the poem, the 'meaning' of which — quite contrary to Alice's
assumption [her grammatical education is still under way] — is 'atomic',
i.e., decontextualized.)
This interpretation, which allows of minor changes but seems to be
generally straightforward, shows Reichert's claim that the sequence of
the six stanzas is totally arbitrary to be only partially true, primarily with
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regard to the plot. This relative independence complies with the White
Rabbit's announcement of a 'set' of verses; after all, the mathematical
concept of a set can refer to a collection of unrelated items, unless some
sort of defining property is given. The referential scope of the plural
pronouns does not extend beyond the stanza in which they occur, except
perhaps, ambiguously, in the last stanza; they are bound up in a mini-
world within the mini-world of the poem, thus emphasizing the verses'
centripetal function by sheer iconicity: the way out is inside, namely, the
three persons. Still, the sequence of the stanzas is not accidental: In the
first two (particularly in the first 6 lines), the pronouns of the two verb-
related cases are introduced (lines 7 and 8 raising the question about the
status of you). Stanza 3 summarizes and mixes the whole lot (emphasizing
the symmetrical character of you), while 4 (subject case) and 5 (object
case) assign them to their appropriate cases. The last stanza — somewhat
set off from the others — mixes them again, reinforcing the secretive,
enigmatic impact. Among the first five stanzas, stanza 3 — essentially
concerned with you — takes a central, mediating position which mirrors
that of you in the person and (because of you's case neutrality) case
paradigms, as well as its symmetrical use in communication.
The general pattern in the use of the pronouns, as explained above,
should be obvious. The singular pronouns are applied in dual function:
they are quoted, which gives them the quality of proper names, but they
also designate abstract positions in the paradigm which are occasionally
adjusted according to the needs of the syntax and the sentence semantics,
the latter being reduced almost exclusively to relational statements.
However, the internal, 'glassy' semantics of the poem, somewhat nonsen-
sical if taken literally, functions as the golden key to the non-literal,
sensible outside world. Carroll seems to trust his reader's ability to find
their track so much that he even takes some pains to lead them astray;
he plays with language very concretely in a typically Anglo-Saxon way,
which should rather be shunned by any sort of bombastic interpretation.
This should not preclude us from letting ourselves be carried away to
some concluding, admittedly somewhat adventurous associative reason-
ing. Playing cards have much in common with pronouns. They are two-
dimensional (not only with regard to their cardboard existence); they
lack a 'real body' and exist only as references to fixed positions in the
system of 'constitutive' (in the sense of Searle) rules of a game of cards,
their 'paradigm'. In their respective positions, however, they are (indivi-
dual) constants (at least as members of a specific set of cards) and are
reified as individuals according to the physical properties of their repre-
sentational pictures, their significant in Saussurean terms: the cardboard
individuals of the story are in fact quotations! The pronouns in the poem
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are likewise presented as referring to rule-defined positions in the para-
digm, and they are likewise individualized by quoting their names. The
mini-world of the poem — and this is just another way of extracting its
key role from the literal — thus appears to be a cparadi(g)mensionar
way out of the 'para-dime-novel' drama in front of the board of cards.
Lewis Carroll must have had a very profound understanding of how
symbols work as constitutive elements of human cognition, of how much
they gear our conceptualizations of the world, imaginary or real — and
if you want to tell the difference, you have to be able to transcend the
symbolic biosphere.
Notes
1. Carroll (1966: 126). Hereafter, all quotations are from this work unless otherwise cited.
2. I would like to thank Prof. Kuno Schuhmann for drawing my attention to this little
poem that I had read more naively (without really making sense of it and therefore
without grasping the fascinating use of symbols here) when I was still a student; he
also made valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper and made important
suggestions about the literature that might be relevant for this sort of investigation.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my colleague Ian Trotter for preventing my adven-
tures in English grammar and style from becoming too hazardous. Of course, I take
full responsibility for any remaining shortcomings.
3. See Carroll (1966: 126).
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